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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
An ex-ante impact analysis of EC Cohesion Policy investment programmes for the period 
2007-2013 was recently carried out on behalf of the European Commission (DG Regional 
Policy) using three different economic models: the  QUEST II model of DG-ECFIN, the 
ECOMOD model of EcoMod Network/Free University of Brussels and the COHESION sys-
tem of HERMIN models of GEFRA/EMDS.  The main results were published in the most 
recent Fourth Cohesion Report (EC, 2007), and it turned out that different models gave dif-
ferent results.  In some cases the differences were very big and pointed to quite different 
conclusions about the impact of the European Cohesion Policy on growth and employment 
impacts.  In order to progress the debate on the usefulness of model-based policy impact 
analysis, we first set out the wider context within which EC Cohesion Policy is designed, 
implemented and evaluated.  We then present a brief summary of the main findings of the 
model-based analysis in terms of impacts on aggregate GDP and total employment. We 
conclude with a discussion of possible reasons why two of the models – QUEST and HER-
MIN - may be producing different results. 
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1 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
 
Since 1989, the European Commission has implemented cohesion policies that now absorb 
over one third of its available annual budgetary resources.1  These policies are embedded in 
a sophisticated system of public investment planning that represents a creative partnership 
between the national governments of the recipient states and the Commission authorities.   
The magnitude of the financial resources devoted to implementing EU Cohesion Policy de-
mands that detailed and searching evaluations of the likely policy outcomes be carried out. 
The challenge of evaluating the impacts of Cohesion Policy programmes lies in the extreme 
complexity of the public policy instruments being used, in terms of individual projects, wider 
measures, operational programmes and the entire investment package taken as a whole.  
The goal of Cohesion Policy – to promote accelerated growth and development in lagging 
EU member states and regions – is ambitious, and draws on economic and other research 
that is still at an early stage of its evolution.  The context within which Cohesion Policy is 
designed, implemented and evaluated is also complex, and this should serve as a warning 
against simplistic evaluations and premature judgements.  Economic models are used to 
deal with these complex evaluation challenges and are the subject of this paper. 
The task of this paper is three-fold.  First, we attempt to stand back from the technical as-
pects of the analysis of Cohesion Policy impacts and identify and describe the logical stages 
of the  whole process starting with the challenge of the European Cohesion Policy, the dif-
ferent steps to be taken to make to implement the programmes, and finally to discuss 
evaluation steps in order to isolate specific areas where evaluators may legitimately differ 
from each other.  Second, we examine three recent model-based evaluations of Cohesion 
Policy impacts that were produced using different models: the (European Commission inter-
nal) QUEST II model of DG-ECFIN, the ECOMOD model of EcoMod Network/Free Univer-
sity of Brussels and the COHESION system of HERMIN models of GEFRA/EMDS.2 These 
results were recently published as part of the Commission’s Fourth Cohesion Report, and 
have been widely discussed (European Commission, 2007).  Third, in light of the radically 
different policy impact results obtained from these three models, we initiate a discussion of 
possible explanations for these differences. 3   
                                                   
1  Cohesion policy programmes have been variously called Structural Funds (SF), Cohesion Funds 
(CF), Community Support Frameworks (CSF), Single Programming Documents (SPD) and Na-
tional Strategic Reference Frameworks (NSRF).  In this paper we use the term “Cohesion Policy” 
(or CP) to refer to all of the above. 
2  The documentation of large-scale macro-models sometimes lags behind improvements made to 
the operational software versions.  Basic descriptions of each of the three model systems can be 
obtained from Roeger and in’t Veld (1997), for QUEST II; Bayar (2007) for ECOMOD; and Bradley 
and Untiedt (2007) for the COHESION System of HERMIN models. 
3  The authors carried out analysis based on the COHESION system of HERMIN models.  Although 
they attempt to be dispassionately scientific in their judgements, it would be reasonable to assume 
that they have certain preferences!  However, they try to make any such judgement calls very ex-
plicit.  
2 
THE LOGIC OF COHESION POLICY ANALYSIS 
 
 
Rather than plunging immediately into a detailed technical examination of the policy analysis 
results of the three models, and the properties of the models that may be influencing the 
different impact conclusions, we suggest that it is first necessary to widen the examination 
into the context within which Cohesion Policy is formulated, implemented and evaluated.  
Only then can the use of models be properly interpreted.  In section 3 we will present the 
actual model impact results, followed by a technical examination of the reasons why models 
(and modellers) differ from each other in their approaches to capturing how economies func-
tion and respond to these policy shocks. 
In an effort to identify the wider taxonomy of Cohesion Policy formation and analysis, we can 
identify a series of fourteen separate logical steps.  These can then be collected into the four 
main stages involved in the analysis of the impacts of Cohesion Policy, which are the follow-
ing: 
Stage 1: The Cohesion Policy challenge (step 1) 
Stage 2: Designing Cohesion Policy interventions (steps 2-4) 
Stage 3: The methodology of Cohesion Policy impact evaluation (steps 5- 10) 
Stage 4: The presentation and interpretation of results (steps 11-14) 
 
The structure and interrelationships of these fourteen steps and four stages are illustrated in 
Figure 1, and we briefly describe each below.  
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2.1 STAGES AND STEPS IN COHESION POLICY DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
Stage 1: The Cohesion Policy challenge 
Step 1:  The cohesion challenge:  Before embarking on model-based analysis, we need to 
explore and understand the main characteristics of the Objective 1-type lagging economies, 
compared with the “advanced” or “mature” EU economies. Prior to the 2004 enlargement 
that brought in eight new member states that had previously been within the Communist 
centrally planned system, the lagging states had been the economies of the EU’s southern 
(Greece, Portugal and Spain) and western (Ireland) periphery.4  Why were they lagging?  
Could they catch up simply through participating in the integrated Single Market and Mone-
tary Union?  What are (if any) the specific barriers to convergence that need an EU policy 
initiative like Cohesion Policy?  How much need we learn before we commit to specific 
macro-modelling frameworks?   
Stage 2: Designing Cohesion Policy interventions 
Step 2:  Cohesion Policy guidelines:  This step deals with the role of the development plan-
ning process in each recipient state as it prepares to receive and use EU aid.  It is a combi-
nation of the identification of national priorities and heavily influenced by guidelines issued by 
the Commission.  In each case, one has to examine carefully how each country or region 
has carried out this task.  What techniques (if any) were used to select measures within the 
investment programmes within the overall policy package?  Were formal micro-evaluation 
techniques applied (e.g., cost-benefit analysis, micro-scoring, etc.)?5  How good is the local 
institutional capacity likely to be?  How did the authorities proceed with implementation? 
Step 3:  Cohesion Policy financial inputs:  This step deals with the formal financial plan, 
where the ex-ante funding allocations are set out in terms of different administrative catego-
ries of public investment.  It also reviews how the administrative investment categories are 
mapped into “economic” categories of investment, such as physical infrastructure, human 
resources and direct aid to firms.  One needs to identify carefully the main economic catego-
ries of investment that are likely to be drivers of faster convergence, since different types of 
investment will influence an economy in different ways and through different mechanisms.  
This step tends to be somewhat neglected in past evaluations and evaluation designs. 
 
Step 4: Economic classification of policy instruments:  This step examines how the invest-
ment flows are transformed into stocks of physical infrastructure, human capital and R&D.  
                                                   
4  The re-unification of Germany brought in the eastern Länder from the early 1990s, but this region 
was also the recipient of massive internal transfers within Germany.  It is difficult to single out the 
separate role of EU Cohesion Policy. 
5  For a review of commonly used micro-evaluation techniques, see Bradley, Mitze, Morgenroth, and 
Untiedt (2006).  The logic of Cohesion Policy analysis  5 
 
Although the flow of investment expenditures impact on the demand side of the economy 
during implementation, it is the improved stocks that actually produce the improved eco-
nomic performance of the economy, even after the investment flows cease.6   
Stage 3: Evaluating Cohesion Policy interventions: methodology 
Step 5: Economic theory and public investment:  Recent theoretical advances in trade the-
ory, growth theory and economic geography provide insights that can be drawn on for the 
planning and analysis of Cohesion Policy.7  These theoretical advances tell us something 
about the role of investment in physical infrastructure, human resources and R&D.  In par-
ticular, they suggest ways in which these policies could promote growth.   
Step 6: Empirics of investment impacts:   Given the theoretical insights that are provided in 
the trade, growth and spatial literatures, we can then seek to establish what the international 
empirical literature tells us about the strength of these drivers.  This literature is still at an 
early stage, and it is easy to become agnostic!8  What is important is to draw lessons from 
empirical studies that provide guidance as to how these driving forces can be related to 
model mechanisms and equations that trace through the consequences for changes in  sec-
toral output and productivity. 
Step 7:  Why are models needed:  The complexity of Cohesion Policies means that models 
must be used to evaluate their impacts.  Without models, one is unable to isolate the influ-
ences of Cohesion Policy from all the other factors that drive a small open economy.9  In 
addition, the financial injections are usually so large that there will be macroeconomic con-
sequences that will affect all aspects of the economy, and not just the areas that are directly 
influenced by the investments (e.g., output and productivity).  
Step 8: What kind of macro model:  One then has to ask the important question of what kind 
of model is appropriate for the evaluation of Cohesion Policy impacts.  This will be influenced 
by insights into what are the key characteristics of the recipient countries (step 1 above).  
What kind of paradigm best captures these characteristics and gives an appropriate descrip-
tion of the supported country?  What level of sectoral disaggregation is required?  We return 
to this vital step in the next section.  But it is important to stress a methodological point here.  
Economic models are very imperfect representations of the real world.  Modern modelling 
practice has tended to assign high status to frameworks that incorporate complete rational 
                                                   
6  It should be recalled that EC Cohesion Policy aid is not open-ended.  The aid programmes tend to 
run for periods of from five to seven years, and are renegotiated when the programming period 
ends. 
7  Krugman and Helpman (1985), Lucas (1988), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Romer (1994), 
Krugman (1995), Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), Aghion and Howitt (2005). 
8  Aschauer (1989), Munnell (1993), Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1993), Schalk and Untiedt 
(2000), Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), Sianesi and van Reenen (2003), Congressional Budget Of-
fice (2005), Romp and de Haan (2007) 
9   Monitoring should be clearly distinguished from impact evaluation.  Monitoring indicators can be 
used to show (for example) how much motorway has been constructed, but cannot identify the role 
of roadway improvements in boosting output and/or productivity. The loigc of Cohesion Policy analysis  6 
optimising behaviour and perfect foresight.10  Such models are elegant but may trap policy 
analysts into interpreting policy impacts on the basis of models that do not represent the 
realistic behaviour of agents in the real world (Akerlof, 2005 and 2007).  The price of realism 
may be a lack of complete optimising elegance! 
Step 9:  Demand versus supply impacts: It is well known that Cohesion Policy investments 
have demand impacts during implementation, and supply impacts both during and long after 
the programmes have terminated.  One must be careful to ensure that this distinction is cap-
tured in the models.  A wide range of other questions also become important.  In particular, 
how are we to handle demand and supply impacts that arise during implementation and after 
termination?  The recipient states sometimes have rather specific characteristics.  Given the 
known characteristics of the recipient states, what could be expected?  Total crowding out of 
private sector activity by the rise in public sector activity?  Partial crowding out?  Crowding 
in?  Ricardian equivalence?  The answers to these questions surely must be heavily influ-
enced by the known facts about the economies being aided.   
Step 10: Sectoral issues in modelling:  A final specific and very important issue arises with 
the models, and concerns the level of disaggregation of sectoral production.  One needs to 
be aware of how each different model addresses questions of sectoral disaggregation on the 
production side of the economy (e.g., QUEST, ECOMOD, HERMIN, etc.).  Can these differ-
ences be subjected to empirical testing?  Which approach is more plausible? 
Stage 4: Evaluating Cohesion Policy interventions: results 
Step 11: The “no Cohesion Policy” counterfactual:  The notion of a “no-Cohesion Policy” 
baseline in not trivial.  In using a macro-model to quantify the impacts of Cohesion Policy 
shocks, all models must go through the following stages:11 
(a) Project all non-Cohesion Policy (CP) exogenous variables out to the terminal year of 
the simulation (i.e., world, domestic policy instruments, etc.).  For the 2007-2013 
Cohesion Policy analysis, this year was taken to be 2020 for all three models. 
(b) Set all CP instruments to the appropriate counterfactual values (see below) 
(c) Simulate the model out to 2020 
(d) Re-set the Cohesion Policy instruments to the appropriate values 
(e) Re-simulate the model to 2020 
(f) Compare results obtained from stage (e) to results from stage (c), to evaluate CP 
impacts 
 
                                                   
10  Bayoumi (2004) describes the IMF DSGE model, GEM; Ratto et al. (2005) describe DG-ECFIN’s 
new DSGE implementation of QUEST III.. 
11  Hanging over step 11 is the spectre of the so-called Lucas critique.  However, all three models are 
based carefully on micro-foundations, albeit in different ways and to different degrees.  But we 
have come a long way from the reduced form, time-series models that Lucas convincingly de-
stroyed in the 1970s! The logic of Cohesion Policy analysis  7 
 
However, a range of different “no-Cohesion Policy” counterfactuals are possible.  We distin-
guish three main cases: the “zero” substitution case; the “full” substitution case; and the “par-
tial” substitution case.  We explain each below. 
(a) The “zero substitution” case:  
Domestic authorities do not substitute with domestic finance, and cancel the entire invest-
ment programme (usually selected as the default case).  In some cases, the fiscal imbal-
ances in a recipient economy would preclude any expansions of public investment.  How-
ever, in other cases the national authorities could step in and fund the Cohesion Policy in-
vestment programme purely out of local resources.12  Of course, in the latter situation, there 
would be more severe fiscal consequences for the public sector budget balance compared to 
the case of EU-funded Cohesion Policy.  
(b) The “full substitution” case:  
Domestic authorities fully implement original CP investments, but financed entirely out of 
own resources (see discussion above).  This could be a mixture of public funding re-
allocation to the kinds of public investments involved in Cohesion Policy, borrowing and tax 
increases. 
(c) The “partial substitution” case:   
Domestic authorities implement only part of the original CP investments, but financed out of 
their own resources.  
Very different implications arise from these counterfactuals.  For example, in the “zero” sub-
stitution case, impact analysis would attribute to Cohesion Policy the entire economic bene-
fits of the CP investments, treating the funding as a grant.  In the “full” substitution case, 
impact analysis in this case would be identical to the “zero substitution” case, except for the 
negative impacts (such as higher tax rates, offsetting cuts in expenditure, higher interest 
rates, exchange rate effects, etc.) of the need to finance domestically.  Finally, the “partial” 
substitution case is difficult to evaluate.  If the cancelled Cohesion Policy investments were 
genuine barriers to growth, the outcome might fall well below “full” substitution.  If the can-
celled investments were poorly designed (high deadweight/crowding out), then this case 
might be actually better than the case of “full” substitution. 
Step 12: Policy Impacts for a single country:  It is useful to present the empirical results, 
initially for a single country so that the presentation can refer to country specifics.  The 
analysis should then provide a wide range of information aimed at interpreting the analysis.   
 
 
                                                   
12  Countries are expected to grow out of the need for EU development aid.  For example, the Irish 
Cohesion Policy funding effectively ended in 2006, having run from 1989 to 2006.  But the Irish au-
thorities have continued with a seven-year national programme that is funded purely out of local 
sources (National Development Plan, 2007)). The loigc of Cohesion Policy analysis  8 
(a) Present stylised facts about the country model.   
(b) Present the no-Cohesion Policy baseline under different assumptions, e.g., zero 
substitution and full substitution. 
(c) Present sensitivity analysis with respect to important model parameters, e.g., the so-
called externality parameters that link changes in stocks of infrastructure, human 
capital and R&D to changes in sectoral output and productivity.  Discuss the conse-
quences in terms of what micro-scoring might indicate about the “quality” of the CP 
planning and implementation. 
(d) Design the presentation of the results for a given country in a way that facilitates 
comparisons with other countries.  The concept of a cumulative Cohesion Policy 
multiplier is particularly useful here (and is explained in the next section). 
 
Step 13: Policy Impacts for many countries:  In a multi-country evaluation, present summary 
results for all the countries, and explore international differences (within a given model sys-
tem) as well as national differences (between the three models). 
Step 14: Drawing conclusions.  Discuss what the evaluations tell about the initial structure 
and characteristics of the economies.  Why do the models produce different results?  What 
can be done about it?  This is, of course, the most important question of all.  But it comes at 
the end of a list of other issues that also influence the answers.  Only when the question of 
model-based impact comparisons is placed in the above wider context can we isolate and 
rationally explore these differences. 
It is useful to enquire informally into whether there are likely to be strong differences of ap-
proach to these steps as between the various modelling groups.  To that end, we suggest 
that the fourteen points can be further subdivided into two distinct groups.  In the first, we 
suggest that there ought to be no strong differences of approach between the three model-
ling groups.  In the second, unfortunately, strong differences of approach can and do legiti-
mately arise. 
2.2 AREAS OF POSSIBLE BROAD AGREEMENT 
Within the range of different impact evaluation studies, there are likely to be areas within the 
above 14 steps where there is broad agreement.  The most obvious cases for agreement 
might be the following: 
Step 2: Cohesion Policy guidelines:  Although there may be differences between the model-
ling groups with respect to the underlying characterisation of the cohesion challenge (step 1, 
to which we will revert below), the Cohesion Policy guidelines – as set out by the Commis-
sion - have to be accepted.  The bottom line is that the modellers are usually asked to evalu-
ate the Commission’s policy, and not any alternative or hypothetical policy package. 
Step 3:  Cohesion Policy financial inputs:  These public investment policy instrument settings 
must also be accepted by all modelling groups.   
Step 4: Economic classification of policy instruments:  Only very minor differences of opinion 
can exist between the three groups concerning how the administrative categories of invest-The logic of Cohesion Policy analysis  9 
 
ment are to be reclassified into economic categories.  Most modelling groups adopt a three-
way classification into physical infrastructure, human resources and direct aid to firms (of 
which R&D is a sub-component), although a higher level of disaggregation might be more 
desirable. 
Step 5: Economic theory and public investment:  Faced with the challenge of analysing Co-
hesion Policy impacts, all modelling groups dip into new growth theory and economic geog-
raphy in order to articulate the theoretical roles of physical infrastructure, human capital and 
R&D in promoting faster growth and catch-up.  There is likely to be a lot of common ground 
here. 
Step 7: Why are models needed:  All modelling groups tend to accept that the role of models 
is to place the Cohesion Policy interventions in a wider macro context, where macro and 
other spillover impacts can be examined. 
Step 11: The “no Cohesion Policy” counterfactual:  There should be little or no differences 
between modelling groups on the taxonomies of the counterfactuals.  However, the counter-
factuals are seldom discussed explicitly (see previous material on Step 11 above), and there 
may be differences of opinion as to the most appropriate counterfactual to adopt as a stan-
dard. 
2.3 AREAS OF POSSIBLE DISAGREEMENT 
Step 1:  The cohesion challenge:  The nature of the cohesion challenge could be regarded 
as having certain ambiguities.  For example, Greece, Portugal and Spain experienced dra-
matic convergence in the 1960-1980 period, without any trans-European policy interventions.  
The Baltic States have recently experienced double-digit growth, before any credible role for 
Cohesion Policy could be asserted.  Some authors display an almost ideological distaste for 
Cohesion Policy, and the book by Herve & Holtzman (1998) is a long catalogue of the poten-
tial evils of policy intervention, untroubled by any actual empirical analysis of the situation in 
individual countries or the conduct of Cohesion Policy.  More recent research by the Dutch 
CPB that failed to find any significant Cohesion Policy impacts was largely based on data 
that preceded the 1989 expansion of Cohesion Funding and its narrower focus on Objective 
1 countries.13  Although they are largely subliminal, there are probably major differences of 
interpretation between modelling groups, and these interpretations of the actual situation in 
the recipient countries and regions may influence the choices of scientific modelling strate-
gies adopted. 
Step 6:  Empirics of investment impacts:   It is possible that all modelling groups have a 
common interpretation of the role of theory in exploring the drivers of growth and catch-up.  
However, there may be differences between the groups as to the strength of these relation-
ships.  Here we are focusing on the immediate relationship between (say) improved physical 
infrastructure and (say) manufacturing output or manufacturing productivity.  We are not 
referring to the wider macro-economic outcome that is obtained when the immediate rela-
tionships are embedded in large-scale models.  The literature presents a wide range of op-
                                                   
13  Ederveen, Gorter, de Mooij and Nahuis (2002).  See Bradley (2007) for a critique of the Ederveen 
et al work and Rodrik (2005) for a more general critique of using growth regressions to investigate 
policy interventions.  The loigc of Cohesion Policy analysis  10 
tions from empirical studies, and is fraught with methodological and conceptual difficulties.  
However, even if there was agreement on what to take from the rather confused empirical 
literature, there would still be problems.  The structures of the different models often impose 
differences in the underlying cohesion mechanisms. 
Step 8:  What kind of macro model: The most important difference between the three groups 
QUEST, ECOMOD and HERMIN probably lies in their choice of the modelling framework.  
This is not to say that there are any deep, fundamental paradigmatic differences between the 
models.  All three draw in varying degrees from recent advances in modelling within the neo-
Keynesian and CGE traditions.  All three have a significant degree of micro underpinnings 
and are probably reasonably robust to the so-called Lucas critique. 
The origins of QUEST II in the analysis of the economies of the “old” EU member states may 
have led to a stance on crowding out that may be appropriate for fiscal policy interventions in 
developed economies that are attempting to stabilize about given concept of capacity output.  
However, the carryover of these mechanisms to the relatively less developed new member 
state economies, many of which are operating at low rates of utilization of already low rates 
of capacity, may be problematic or inappropriate.  We return to this important  point in the 
next section. 
Step 9:  Demand versus supply impacts: Although the need to distinguish demand (imple-
mentation) effects from long-lasting supply (post-implementation) effects is accepted by all 
groups, the empirical analysis can lead to dramatically different outcomes, mainly due to the 
issues mentioned in Step 8 above. 
Step 10: Sectoral issues in modelling:  Under this heading we draw attention to the fact that 
any detailed examination of Cohesion Policy impacts needs to be performed at a level of 
sectoral disaggregation that permits – at the very least - the separate analysis of manufactur-
ing, market services, agriculture and government.  With few exceptions, the main sectoral 
driver of growth has been manufacturing, or sub-sectors of manufacturing.  The rise of mar-
ket services from a very low base has been a common characteristic of the post-Communist 
transition of the new EU member states of the CEE area.  Also, the agricultural sector has 
very specific characteristics that may serve to distort Cohesion Policy analysis unless the 
sector is isolated.  For example, it is conceivable  that the one sector approach used by 
QUEST, compared to the modestly disaggregated approach of HERMIN and the highly dis-
aggregated approach of ECOMOD, may distort the comparisons of their results. 
Steps 12-14: Policy impacts:  The dramatically different analyses of Cohesion Policy impacts 
derived from the three models (QUEST, ECOMOD and HERMIN) are simply the results of all 
the divergences in modelling that are outlined above.  
3 
THREE MODEL-BASED EVALUATIONS OF COHESION POL-
ICY: 2007-2013 
 
 
Three model-based ex-ante evaluations of EU Cohesion Policy were commissioned by DG 
Regional Policy in early 2007, and formed an input to the Fourth Cohesion Report published 
in May.14  These evaluations explored the likely impact of the investments funded during the 
2007-2013 expenditure programme.  A common set of Cohesion Policy financial data was 
used by all three modelling groups: the QUEST II model of DG ECFIN; the ECOMOD model 
of EcoMOD Network/Free University of Brussels and the HERMIN models of the COHE-
SION-System developed for the Commission by GEFRA/EMDS.15 
Although the different models have the potential to examine the impacts of Cohesion Policy 
on many different aspects of economic performance, the impacts on aggregate GDP and on 
aggregate employment serve to characterise the key features of the three different evalua-
tions.  Such analysis is usually presented in terms of the comparison of a “with Cohesion 
Policy” scenario relative to a “without Cohesion Policy” scenario.  This distinction is not with-
out its complications, and there are a range of alternative counterfactuals.  Using the termi-
nology set out above, all three models implemented the “zero” substitution counterfactual. 
In Figure 2 we present a comparison of the impacts of the 2007-2013 Cohesion Policy pro-
grammes on the level of GDP, taking the case of Poland as an example.16   The graphs 
show the percentage increase in the level of GDP in the “with-CP” case when compared to 
the baseline “without-CP” case. 
                                                   
14  See European Commission (2007), Chapter 2 for the model results.  
15   http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/rado_en.htm.  
16  Poland is a useful example, since it absorbs a very significant proportion of total Cohesion Policy 
funding. Three model-basedl evalutations of Cohesion Policy  12 
Figure 2: 
QUEST, ECOMOD & HERMIN - GDP impacts 
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Source: ECOMOD (2007) DG ECFIN (2007), GEFRA/EMDS (2007) 
Remark: QUEST figures for 2016 to 2019 follow from a linear interpolation. 
 
 
In Figure 3 we present a comparison of the impacts on the level of total employment.  Once 
again, the graphs show the percentage increase in the level of total employment in the “with-
CP” case when compared to the baseline “without-CP” case. 
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Figure 3: 
QUEST, ECOMOD & HERMIN - Employment impacts 
(percentage deviation from baseline) 
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Source: ECOMOD (2007) DG ECFIN (2007), GEFRA/EMDS (2007) 
Remark: QUEST figures for 2016 to 2019 follow from a linear interpolation. 
 
The patterns of the impacts on GDP and on employment derived from the three models  
show significant differences.  The ECOMOD analysis shows a rapid build-up of the impact 
on GDP, to about 8% higher than the baseline in the termination year 2015.17  After termina-
tion, the impact on GDP continues to rise, reaching about 10% above the baseline by the 
year 2020.  In the cases of QUEST and HERMIN, the GDP impacts indicated by both mod-
els during the implementation period 2007-2015 resemble each other, reaching a peak im-
pact of 5.7% (QUEST) and 5.1% (HERMIN).  Thereafter, the HERMIN impacts fall off more 
than the QUEST impacts, to end at 4.7% (QUEST) and 3.2% (HERMIN). 
The differences between the models in the impacts on total employment are much more 
dramatic.  The ECOMOD impacts follow the same pattern as the impacts on GDP, rising to 
an increase of  4.7% by end 2015, and increasing further to almost 6% by 2020 (relative to 
the “no-CP baseline level of total employment).  The QUEST analysis suggests that there 
                                                   
17  Although the Cohesion Policy programme for the seven year period 2007-2013 is being analysed, 
the so-called “n+2” rule is invoked by all three models, so that financial aid terminates at the end of 
the year 2015.  The assumption is also made post-2015 that there is no subsequent Cohesion Pol-
icy aid, nor any domestically funded alternative.  This is an extreme assumption, but one that was 
mandated by the Commission in their instructions to the model users. Three model-basedl evalutations of Cohesion Policy  14 
will be almost no impact on employment, either during implementation (peaking at 0.3% 
above the baseline) or after termination (reaching 0.2% above the baseline by 2020).  The 
HERMIN analysis suggests that there will be fairly strong impacts during implementation, 
rising to 2.6% by 2015, but falling off rapidly after termination and stabilizing at a long-term 
increase of just over 1% (relative to the no-CP baseline). 
Clearly these three model-based impact studies are pointing in very different directions.  
ECOMOD suggests that there are likely to be very strong, and ever increasing impacts on 
GDP and employment associated with the Cohesion Policy investment programmes for the 
period 2007-2015.  These GDP impacts are dramatically larger than those found using either 
QUEST or HERMIN. 
Turning to employment impacts, serious differences now emerge between  QUEST and 
HERMIN, even though both of these models broadly agree on the GDP impacts.  The almost 
insignificant employment impact shown by QUEST (even during the implementation period 
2007-2015) is in contrast to the stronger implementation impact shown by HERMIN.  But in 
the case of HERMIN, the termination of the Cohesion Policy funding after 2015 induces a 
demand contraction that reduces the longer term employment increase.  In summary, by the 
year 2020, the increase in employment suggested by ECOMOD is six times bigger than that 
found using HERMIN and almost thirty times bigger than the QUEST results. 
We conclude our presentation of the modelling impact results by showing two figures that 
are based on the HERMIN analysis.18  In Figure 4 we show the results of impact analysis in 
a situation where there are no spillover effects from the improved stocks of physical infra-
structure, human capital and R&D.19  This is an unrealistic and extreme counterfactual, and 
represents a case of Cohesion Policy investment programmes that was so badly designed 
and poorly implemented that no enduring benefits arose from the investments.20  Figure 4(a) 
shows the Cohesion Policy funding injection (as a percentage of GDP), and the GDP impact 
(expressed as a percentage increase relative to the no-CP baseline).  Although there is a 
modest “Keynesian” demand-side boost during implementation (2007-2015), there are no 
enduring benefits.  Figure 4(b) shows the case of “standard” spillover effects, that were used 
in the earlier analysis reported in Figures 2 and 3 above. These spillovers are phased in  
linearly from the year 2004, and have full effect after five years. As the stocks of physical 
infrastructure, human capital and R&D build up after 2007, the supply-side benefits take 
effect, and even after termination, the economy is more productive.In summary, the CP 
shock is the same in Figures 4(a) and (b), but the difference in the impacts on GDP is ac-
counted for by the supply-side spillover effects that are assumed to be absent in 4(a) but are 
present in (in “standardised” form) in 4(b).  
                                                   
18  The analysis in Figures 4 and 5 could easily be replicated for QUEST and ECOMOD, but the au-
thors only have access to the HERMIN software. 
19  The spillover (or externality) effects of improved physical infrastructure, human capital and R&D 
are described in Steps 5 and 6 of Section 2 above.  All three models incorporate such mecha-
nisms, but differ in the empirical values assumed. 
20  In his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, John Maynard Keynes described how 
an economy in recession could be stimulated if the government paid for holes to be dug in the 
ground, and filled in again.  An NSRF/NDP with zero spillover impacts would be a bit like this! Three model-based evaluations of Cohesion Policy  15 
 
Figure 4: 
HERMIN: Demand- vs. supply-side effects of Cohesion Policy interventions  
Cohesion Policy (GDP) as a percentage of GDP and GDP (Impact)  
as percentage deviation from baseline  
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b) Standard spillover elasticities - Poland Three model-basedl evalutations of Cohesion Policy  16 
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Finally, in Figure 5 we show the so-called cumulative Cohesion Policy multiplier for the 
HERMIN analysis, in the cases of zero and standard spillover effects.  The normal policy 
multiplier (at time t) is defined as follows: 
 
                                                          Change in GDP 
Normal policy multiplier  =  ---------------------------------- 
                                                  Change in public investment 
 
However, the cumulative policy multiplier (between time t and time t+n) is defined as: 
 
                                                    Cumulative percentage change in GDP 
Cumulative CP multiplier  =  ------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                   Cumulative percentage share of CP in GDP 
 
Figure 5 illustrates how the spillover effects from the Cohesion Policy investments generate 
a return in terms of increased output.  When these spillovers are positive (as in a well-
designed Cohesion Policy intervention) the cumulative multiplier increases.  When the spill-
over effects are assumed to be zero (as in a very poorly designed investment programme), 
the cumulative multiplier is flat, and merely captures the Keynesian multiplier effects. 
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Figure 5:  
HERMIN: Cumulative Multiplier of Cohesion Policy interventions – Poland 
Cumulative Impact defined as: Cumulative GDP (Impact) /  
Cumulative Cohesion Policy (GDP)  
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4 
INTERPRETING THE DIFFERENT MODEL-BASED 
 IMPACT ANALYSES 
 
 
Unfortunately it is only possible to compare and contrast the structure of QUEST and the 
HERMIN models, since full information on the ECOMOD model was not available at the time 
of writing.  Drawing on comparisons of analysis carried out using QUEST and HERMIN, one 
is driven to the conclusion that these are based on rather different views of how the econo-
mies of the recipient countries behave.  These different views have been incorporated into 
QUEST and HERMIN, both of which operate according to broadly neo-Keynesian rules. 
Our diagnosis is that the first key difference between QUEST and HERMIN-based CP analy-
sis concerns the manner in which spillover, or externality effects from the Structural Funds 
are incorporated into the two models.  These were briefly discussed in Steps 5 and 6 above.  
We now examine this issue in more detail. 
4.1 MODELLING COHESION POLICY SUPPLY-SIDE SPILLOVER EFFECTS 
Both QUEST and HERMIN used similar financial data for the Cohesion Policy shock.  The 
demand-side impact mechanisms are handled in a similar way, with elements of expenditure 
being affected during the programmes implementation phase (i.e., 2007-2015).  Of course, 
both models differ in the modelling of expenditure (private consumption and investment, in 
particular), but we return to this point later.  There are some differences in the manner in 
which the financial data were transformed into changed stocks of physical infrastructure, 
human capital and R&D, but these are likely to be minor.  The biggest difference is in the 
manner in which the improved stocks influence sectoral output and productivity in the mod-
els. 
QUEST is a one-sector model, with modelling only at the level of aggregate private sector 
output.  Improved stocks of infrastructure and human capital feed into capacity output in 
QUEST, through a Cobb-Douglas (CD) production function that has constant returns to pri-
vate factor inputs (labour and private capital) and increasing returns to public capital.  Con-
sequently, it is mainly through the consequences of capacity utilization that QUEST reacts 
on the supply-side.  During the implementation phase, capacity utilization is driven up, as 
demand impacts outstrip the gradual build-up of new capacity.  This generates large crowd-
ing-out mechanisms.  This may be further increased by assumptions made on the expendi-
ture side of QUEST, and we return to this below. 
Production modelling in the HERMIN models of the COHESION System is on the basis of 
five sectors: manufacturing, market services, building and construction, agriculture and non-
market services (Bradley and Untiedt, 2007).  Factor demands in the first three are deter-
mined on the basis of cost minimization (using a CES production function constraint).  A Interpreting the different model-based impact analyses  19 
 
simpler approach is used in agriculture, and output in non-market services is policy driven 
through employment and wages. 
For the important manufacturing sector (and also for the service and building and construc-
tion sector), HERMIN drew on the SOE modelling research of Bradley and FitzGerald 
(1988), and where country (capacity) output is not determined directly by a national produc-
tion function constraint (as in QUEST).  Rather, the national production function appears in 
the determination of the national technology (via national factor demand equations), and the 
national output equation originated from a higher level "global" production function.  This 
approach attempts to capture the essential notion that integrating within the EU Single Mar-
ket, and particularly the integration of its peripheral and weakest economies, is best handled 
directly through the internationalisation of production than indirectly, through trade flows.   
Consequently, output determination in manufacturing can be directly influenced by improved 
infrastructure, human capital and R&D, through making the recipient economies more attrac-
tive as hosts to inward investment, and strengthening the internal attractiveness of the com-
petitive environment for locally owned firms.  The international empirical literature is used to 
provide plausible values for the externality parameters. 
National productivity can also be influenced directly by improved stocks of infrastructure, 
human capital and R&D, and these effects are incorporated into the national CES production 
functions.  In other words, while the output effects are mainly international in their conse-
quences (affecting the international allocation of production), the productivity effects are local 
and serve to modify the local production technology.21 
4.2 OTHER DIFFERENCES BETWEEN QUEST AND HERMIN 
Another important difference between the QUEST and HERMIN-based analysis probably lie 
in the different nature and strength of crowding out mechanisms, through the labour market 
(Philips curve), through fiscal tightening and through monetary tightening.  The analysis pre-
sented in the reports made available to the authors does not permit a thorough analysis of 
these issues, but they need to be examined.  For example, the assumption is made in 
QUEST that all increases in productivity are passed on to labour.  Consequently, none of the 
productivity increases caused by Cohesion Policy will have any effect in increasing cost 
competitiveness in the recipient countries.  In HERMIN, on the other hand, empirical analysis 
suggests that there is a less than full pass-through of productivity changes to wages.  This is 
quite striking in some countries, such as Poland.  Where there is significant foreign owner-
ship of firms, this affects the role of productivity pass-through.  Our judgement is that the 
strong crowding-out features of QUEST may not be appropriate to the lagging economies of 
many of the new member states.  In particular, the “grant” nature of Cohesion Policy funding, 
with a “weakened” concept of additionality, may not be reflected in the QUEST analysis. 
 
Another big difference between QUEST and HERMIN is that the former imposes model-
consistent expectations, while the latter uses static (or auto-regressive) expectations.  What 
                                                   
21  See Bradley, Petrakos and Traistaru (2004) for further details. Interpreting the different model-based impact analyses  20 
this means is that in QUEST, agents have perfect (model consistent) information about the 
exact future consequences of cohesion policy impacts and consequences, and can react 
today in light of tomorrow’s impacts.  HERMIN makes no such assertion.  Rather, it takes a 
pragmatic view that for the analysis of extremely long-tailed investment policies in rapidly 
transforming economies, the incorporation of model consistent expectations (MCEs) is 
probably not justifiable in terms of the context of these economies.  Furthermore, if the basic 
model set-up is inappropriate, the incorporation of MCEs simply compounds the error and 
increases the possibility of misinterpretation of the policy analysis.  MCEs are perhaps more 
appropriate for the analysis of short-term demand and monetary shocks, where the underly-
ing economic structure is fairly stable and well understood.  There is less justification for their 
use for long-term supply-side shocks administered mainly through public investment in pro-
ductive infrastructure and human capital, in a situation where the underlying structure is not 
well understood, and is rapidly changing. 
On a more technical issue, in QUEST the degree of liquidity constrained consumption be-
haviour assumed for the new member state models is 40% compared with 30% in the 
OMS.22  Is there strong empirical evidence that the liquidity constraint in the new member 
states of the CEE area is so low?  With such a low degree of liquidity constraint, and the 
assumption of MCEs, it is not surprising that there is so much crowding out of employment in 
the QUEST-based analysis. 
Another technical issue concerns the nature of the production technology used in QUEST.  It 
should also be noted that a property of the Cobb-Douglas production function is that all fac-
tor inputs are substitutes.23  In a more generalised production function (e.g., nested CES, 
Generalised Leontief, etc.), the possibility arises that public and private capital might actually 
be complements.  This CD-based restriction may be a factor in the high crowding out 
mechanisms that appear to operate within QUEST. 
                                                   
22  In other words, 40 per cent of households are assumed to be liquidity constrained, and the remain-
ing 60% can be modelled in terms of (forward-looking) permanent income. 
23  The assumption is also made in QUEST that the marginal product of public capital stock (Kpub) is 
the same as the marginal product of private capital stock (Kpriv).    
5 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
It is possible to attempt to pinpoint more accurately those aspects of the QUEST and HER-
MIN model frameworks that may be at the basis of the dramatic differences in their implica-
tions for the analysis of the impacts of Cohesion Policy.  We stress that we offer merely initial 
insights for the purposes of stimulating further discussion.  Macro-models are very complex 
tools, and are intrinsically difficult to compare.  And the most active area of design and 
analysis of Cohesion Policy are currently the former centrally planned states of Eastern 
Europe, where one has access to time series data only from the mid-1990s. 
We conclude with the observation that the impact analysis of Cohesion Policy interventions 
is very complex and the final results shown to the audience are determined by a series of 
hidden decisions taken by the modellers which are seldom obvious but determine the out-
come. To be able to use and judge the results it is absolutely necessary to be fully transpar-
ent concerning the exact set-up of the models. Otherwise, macro-economic Cohesion Policy 
impact analysis will continue to be an impenetrable “black-box”.  The obvious theoretical 
advantage claimed for macro-models, i.e., to be able to look at Cohesion Policy impacts in a 
way that takes into account the specific and realistic economic relations within the recipient 
countries and their linkage to the rest of the world, will not be realised in practice.  
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